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As presidential elections carry the promise of distilling the contested and elusive
“will of the people,” the protracted media event intensifies the public demand for expos-
ing the transgressions of the aspiring political elite. This expectation provides fertile
ground for investigative journalism, ultrapartisan smear campaigns, fake news, and full-
fledged conspiracy theories that are sometimes difficult to differentiate from one another
in a hybridized media space. We compare three unique conspiracy stories—Macron-
leaks, Pizzagate, and Voter fraud—emerging during the previous French and American
elections. We assess the divergent strategies of social action that contribute to the sto-
ries’ dissimilar patterns for intervening the political news cycle with the “reinformative
toolkit” and deconstruct the common conspiratorial “masterplot” for “reinforming” the
public. Focusing on online “produsers”—media users functioning as (dis)information
producers—we analyze how the grassroots level participated in shaping the conspiracy
stories’ synopses and channeling news-framed, conspiratory content between mainstream
and “countermedia” outlets.
Introduction
Large-scale media events create fertile ground for generating disinforma-
tion in various narrative forms, often tailored to spread across the divergent
range of “new” and “old” media platforms (Faris et al. 2017; Ferrara 2017). As
highly mediatized presidential campaigns carry the promise of distilling the elu-
sive and contested “will of the people,” they face journalistic scrutiny that
seeks to poke holes in the candidates’ public image by revealing “inconvenient
truths” (Gerstle 2012; Mercier 2006). As the expectation of having the candi-
dates’ true colors exposed is deeply internalized among the public (Linz 1990),
such anticipation also creates the markets and demand for deeply biased, ultra-
partisan smear campaigns (Vaccari and Morini 2014) that may evolve into full-
fledged conspiracy stories.
In this article, we study three conspiracy stories that paint a picture of a
corrupt “elite” that wields political power by secretly undermining democratic
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institutions for personal or political gain. Pizzagate and Voter fraud intervened
in the political news cycle during the American 2016 presidential elections.
The former alleged Hillary Clinton’s involvement in a pedophile ring in the
basement of a D.C. pizzeria, while the latter asserted that millions of immi-
grants and dead people were voting illegally. During the 2017 French presiden-
tial elections, Macronleaks leaked tampered documents linking Emmanuel
Macron to money laundering, homosexuality, and drug use. Recently, several
excellent studies have analyzed how these information campaigns sought to
spread their conspiratory message across different media spaces (e.g., Cottrell,
Herron, and Westwood 2018; Downing and Ahmed 2019; Rebillard 2017).
Complementing these approaches, we adopt a comparative research setting to
emphasize how a common conspiratory “masterplot” (Abbott 2008:47) and a
“reinformative toolkit” of collective action can structure and facilitate interven-
tions into political news cycle across hybridized media environments transna-
tionally (Leskovec, Backstrom, and Kleinberg 2009; Chadwick 2011:5–6).
A key site for conspiracy theorizing can be located in the constellation of
ultrapartisan “countermedia” outlets that publishes news-framed content aimed
at discrediting “the elite establishment” at large, and eroding the trust in main-
stream media (Yl€a-Anttila, Bauvois, and Pyrh€onen 2019; Yl€a-Anttila 2017:46).
Although mainstream and countermedia outlets typically disagree on framings
and even the subject matter of the news events they cover, both types of outlets
face many similar incentives that shape, structure, and monetize their output.
Notwithstanding the divergent approaches to journalistic standards, newsworthi-
ness and political agenda setting, both benefit from employing “media populist
logic” (Mazzoleni 2003) of spreading emotionalized and polarizing news-
framed content. An extreme instance of such strongly affective content, con-
spiracy theorizing exemplifies how this logic can be harnessed for channeling
news-framed content in the interstices of mainstream and countermedia outlets,
the so-called “hybrid media system” (Chadwick 2013).
Ongoing elections further accentuate the overlap in countermedia and
mainstream coverage of the political elite. While countermedia-based conspiracy
stories seek to “reinform” their audiences by attributing any and all societal prob-
lems to corrupt members of “the elite” (Blanc 2016), mainstream outlets fiercely
compete to first expose presidential candidates’ hidden networks, contacts, and
activities. With emotionalized, story-framed misinformation on political topics
circulating “significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth”
(Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018), it becomes notoriously difficult for audiences
to differentiate between news-framed “scandals” that are built on rigorous jour-
nalistic work from those emerging in collectively curated rumors and disinforma-
tion. As a result, about one-third of both French and American citizens endorse
one or more conspiracy stories (Fenster 2017; IFOP 2017).
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In order to compare the three conspiracy stories’ trajectories into the news
cycle, we first present our theoretical framework, conceptualizing how interven-
tions in “the hybrid media system” harness a “reinformative toolkit” of prac-
tices that “produse” news-framed storylines following a conspiratory
“masterplot.” We then operationalize the theoretical framework with regard to
our mixed-methods approach and the inductive process of data collection,
allowing us to conduct the analysis in two sections. First, we delineate the
hybridly mediatized body of “leaks” and “scandals,” pinpointing the critical
junctures of conspiracy theorizing in the dataset to be examined as reinforma-
tive interventions. We then proceed to analyze the rich narrative subject matter
as building blocks of the conspiratory masterplot, focusing on the masterplot’s
reinformative functions in the polarized public debate on presidential elections.
We conclude in a discussion of divergent avenues for produsing conspiratory
reinformation and channeling political fable in the hybrid media system.
Theoretical Framework: The Produsage of Reinformation within the
Hybrid Media System
Macronleaks, Pizzagate, and Voter fraud are examples of highly spread-
able, transnationally reported, produser-generated, ultrapartisan campaigns that
span the media space from online sphericules and countermedia to mainstream
news outlets. The combination of such modes of political communication has
sometimes been regarded as epitomizing the so-called “post-truth era” (Barrera
Rodriguez et al. 2018; Keyes 2004; McGranahan 2017; Wieviorka 2017),
whose constitutive narrative elements and practices often become unproblemati-
cally labeled as “disinformation” and “fake news” in public debate (Lazer et al.
2018; Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook 2017). By comparing these conspiracy
stories as hybridly mediatize produsage of reinformation, we illustrate a
nuanced process of online storytelling, where produsers harnessing practices in
the reinformative toolkit collectively curate news-framed content into a conspir-
atory masterplot that penetrates mainstream gatekeeping.
There is notable scholarship on polarizing mechanisms in online opinion
formation, conceptualized as the emergence of “filter bubbles” that structure
available information (Pariser 2012), the introduction of semi-hermetic “spher-
icules” (Galston 2003; Gitlin 1998; Papacharissi 2002), or even “information
cocoons” for preaching to the converted (Sunstein 2008). This literature, epito-
mizing an “echo chamber” approach to online opinion formation, has more
recently been complemented by approaches emphasizing the communal practice
of low-threshold “produsage” (Bruns 2017). While produsage is commonly
linked to an ideal of “participative journalism” and the emergence of “citizen
journalism” (Cammaerts 2007), the diminished threshold for online content
curation can also drive an opportunist process, where ultrapartisan produser
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communities, emerging in distinct sphericules, seek to “reinform” the public. In
the “hybrid media system,” produsers:
create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their goals and in ways that modify,
enable, or disable others’ agency, across and between a range of older and newer media set-
tings [in] ‘professional’ and ‘amateur’ forms. (Chadwick 2013:4)
This intimate interplay and discursive contestation in the interstices of
“old” and “new” media—and the ensuing low-threshold opportunity structures
for influencing public debate at large—are definitive characteristics of the
hybrid media system. Most of these political opportunity structures stem from
the introduction of inexpensive online tools and resource-light practices of
“produsage” (Bruns 2008). These allow increased numbers of non- and semi-
professional “produsers” to fluidly transition between the positions of grass-
roots-level online discussant, networked gatekeeper, and mediators, curating
content for their “gated” audiences to the extent that may even generate salient
mainstream exposure for the “news-framed” curated content (Nahon 2015:47).
By blurring the boundaries between curatorial and gatekeeping roles in journal-
istic content creation—and by eroding distinctions between professional and
produser-based identities—the hybrid media system increasingly exerts influ-
ence upon various media spaces. Moreover, by allowing a variety of content to
be news-framed—in the sense of being distributed specifically as news (Tuch-
mann 1978)—the hybrid media system facilitates produser-driven “construction
of news” (Chadwick, Dennis, and Smith 2015:13–14).
We define “reinformation”1 as the proactive, politically inspired, ideologi-
cal, online community-driven side of produsage in the hybrid media system. In
colloquial language, reinformation has for decades connoted “propaganda” or
“indoctrination.” Since the early 2000s, the term and its inflected forms were
reintroduced as a distinct concept in French media sociology, pertaining to the
operative logic of emergent, rapidly expanding online fora (“reinfosphere”) that
explicitly define their aim as counterbalancing the allegedly biased mainstream
news coverage (Blanc 2016:197; Hare 2004; Jammet and Guidi 2017).
The body of scientific literature on online “produsage” of “reinformation”
covers a range of approaches, from the injection of produser-generated content
into the hybrid media system (Bruns and Burgess 2012; Rebillard 2017) and
the crafting of memes as operative signs for mobilization (Shifman 2014) to
the interaction of botnets and human audiences in the spread of this content
(Ferrara 2017; Lazer et al. 2018). This article complements such approaches,
providing in-depth, qualitative understanding of the produsage of reinformative,
news-framed conspiracy stories, including practices that generate transnational
coverage for this content within the hybrid media system.
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During the 2000s, several “countermedia” outlets—such as Fdesouche
(2004) and Breitbart News (2007) analyzed in this article—have successfully
channeled “reinformation” across media spaces. By publishing content that
merges fact and fiction in a spreadable, “alternative,” news-framed format,
countermedia challenges “the established epistemic authorities” of “the liberal
elite” in the mainstream media and in public office (Yl€a-Anttila 2017). The
spread of news-framed conspiracy stories—where “elites” wield power by
secretly corrupting democratic institutions—exemplifies how countermedia
operationalizes the “media populist logic” in the hybrid media system (Mudde
2007:251). Harnessing the reinformative toolkit as a set of rapid, resource-light,
low-threshold practices of produsage, these outlets inject emotionalizing and
polarizing content in the news cycle for the purpose of reinforming publics
across media spaces (Maigrot, Kijak, and Claveau 2016).
Facilitating the curation and spread of reinformation, communities of
grassroots-level produsers form the countermedia’s “free, exploited labor”
(Nixon 2015) as its “digital foot soldiers” (Hatakka 2016; Vaccari and Valeri-
ani 2016). They commonly articulate an oxymoronic self-positioning as author-
itative representatives of “the people” nevertheless “fighting the elite media
with bows and arrows” (Copsey 1996; Pyrh€onen 2015). Articulations of this
pariah-like subject-position and the deeply affective, anti-establishment ethos
form the core of political conspiracy theories, “rooted in and emerg[ing] from
the very logic of populism” (M€uller 2016:32).
Conveniently for the countermedia and its produser base, conspiracy story
is an efficient narrative format for circulating reinformation in the hybrid media
system. A recent, influential study by Science concluded that story-framed false
information, particularly narratives on political topics, such as presidential elec-
tions, circulates “significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the
truth” (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018). The authors point out that even the less
connected, non-professional, grassroots-level (human) produsers are signifi-
cantly more efficient in generating spread for false information than more
established produsers in generating spread for accurate information, while both
are more efficient than bots. This further underlines the importance of using the
concept of reinformation in the analysis of how so-called “alt-right” produsers,
curating and narrating conspiratory content to a variety of audiences and pub-
lics (Nagle 2017), are able to harness new political opportunity structures in
the hybrid media system.
The produsers of reinformation seek to create narratives that must be
repeatedly proven false in public. Once a conspiracy story starts to resonate
strongly enough in the produser-driven reinfosphere, this resonance itself ele-
vates the storyline’s newsworthiness in the mainstream sphere. The encompass-
ing processes of rebuttal and fact checking in the mainstream space further
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incentivize the produsage of reinformation across the hybrid media system.
Once such a cycle emerges, it renders conspiracy stories like Pizzagate and
Voter fraud even more nuanced and widely accessible (Barrera Rodriguez et al.
2018). Other conspiracy stories, such as Macronleaks, receive only transient
coverage and fade away. This great variance in the narrative subject matter,
reinformative produsage, and the actual outcomes of conspiracy stories calls for
careful empirical analysis.
Indeed, underlying these theoretical insights is the empirical reality, where
only certain reinformative storylines are able to secure persistently salient main-
stream exposure, effectively establishing themselves as “public stories” (Feld-
man and Almqvist 2011), contemporary fables that people commonly “know
of,” regardless of how they relate to them. In addition to the strategic dimen-
sions related to produsage, it is also important to study the process by which
conspiracy theorizing becomes an actual public story.
Drawing from Ann Swidler’s seminal work on cultural toolkits (1986) that
has inspired recent sociological research on participative political practices and
cultures (e.g., Eranti 2016; Luhtakallio 2012), we conceptualize toolkits as sets
of collective practices that form “recognizable orientations toward the social
world” (Yl€a-Anttila 2017:7). As a key means for propagating the reinformative
orientation—according to which established sources of information, particularly
the mainstream media, are profoundly unreliable and intentionally misleading
their audiences—produsers of reinformation can be considered to harness a “re-
informative toolkit.” This entails produsers generating interventions into the
mainstream news cycle through practices and techniques at the core of the rein-
formative pursuit—particularly through collective curation of spreadable, news-
framed content, such as “leaks,” controversies, and scandals on polarizing,
highly mediatized topics.
Going beyond the reinformative toolkit as a set of practices and tech-
niques, in this article we also examine conspiracy story as a specific type and
format of news-framed narrative subject matter that produsers of reinformation
rely on in the transnational context of hybridly mediatized presidential elec-
tions. By curating content—both freshly prodused by the grassroots-level “digi-
tal foot soldiers” and news events covered by mainstream outlets—the
produsers of Macronleaks, Pizzagate, and Voter fraud engage in developing a
recurring and skeletally adaptable “masterplot” (Abbott 2008:47) of an overar-
ching conspiracy among a corrupted cabal of political and media elite.
Data and Methods: Assembling Conspiracy Stories for Analysis
In order to operationalize the three conspiracy stories for analysis, we first
collect data concerning their origins and lifecycles in the hybrid media system.
The timeframe for data collection begins in October 2016 when the Pizzagate
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and Voter Fraud stories broke during the late stages of campaigning in the
U.S. presidential elections. The timeframe ends in May 2017, when the media-
tization of Macronleaks became subdued upon Emmanuel Macron’s election as
the president of France. During this eight-month timeframe, we inductively col-
lected data from the output of 16 mainstream, 11 “countermedia,” and 5 social
media outlets that our preliminary research suggested had been actively cover-
ing one or more of the three conspiracy stories. We analyze the data, collected
from the output from the 32 outlets (Table 1), illustrating in two sections how
these conspiracy stories are prodused as reinformation in the hybrid media sys-
tem.
We first identify key nodes in the produsage or spread of the conspiracy
stories, establishing the critical junctures when and where the stories and their
specific elements gained and lost public attention. In order to achieve this, we
first employ Google Trends for tracing the temporal development of the relative
search frequencies for the titular queries “macronleaks,” “pizzagate,” and “voter
fraud” (Figure 1).
There is a voluminous and expanding scholarship successfully harnessing
Google Trends in inductive research design (Jun, Yoo, and Choi 2018). Select-
ing “right” or “best” search terms for data collection can be very difficult when
doing research on more diffuse societal phenomena (a myriad of relevant
queries for “gay marriage” being the case in point discussed by Reilly, Richey,
and Benjamin Taylor 2012:152). However, Google Trends has been particularly
successful and efficient for tracing specific kinds of sensational news events:
political tumult, elections, public controversy, or disease outbreaks and epi-
demics (Dugas et al. 2012; Lazer et al. 2018). These events, much like the con-
spiracy stories studied here,2 typically emerge during clearly delineated,
pinpointable time periods, and are commonly marked by a large increase in
highly specific or even unique search queries (such as “pizzagate”). As illus-
trated in the seminal work by Leskovec, Backstrom, and Kleinberg (2009),
such “short, distinctive phrases [. . .] travel relatively intact through on-line
text,” allowing changes in certain search terms’ frequencies to be operational-
ized into reliable indicators of the studied phenomenon’s alternating salience in
the news cycle.
In the first section of the analysis, we use the peaks and slumps in titular
query frequencies, charted in the figure above, to locate the wax and wane of
the public interest in the three conspiracy stories during the timeframe. Peaks
and slumps in Google Trends only represent relative search frequency values,
normalized by Google, not absolute volumes for specific queries. While this
method does not allow assessing the overall salience of these conspiracy stories
in the news cycle, we can operationalize the peaks and slumps as critical junc-
tures—the moments of conspiracy stories’ emergence, decline, or re-emergence
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in the hybrid media system. Moreover, as we track each of the three titular
queries in the same Google Trends search, we can compare the pervasiveness
or the abruptness of change in search frequencies between the three titular
queries.
After locating the critical junctures in the saliency of the three conspiracy
stories, we proceed to identify the instances where the produsage of reinforma-
tion temporally coincides with, and possibly contributes to, the steepest shifts
Table 1
List of Outlets Included in the Inductive Data Collection
Mainstream outlets Countermedia outlets Produser-driven outlets
20 minutes (macronleaks) Anonews (pizzagate) 4chan (macronleaks
and pizzagate)
BBC (all) Breitbart (all) Facebook (pizzagate)
Buzzfeed (pizzagate) Disobedient Media
(macronleaks)
Pastebin (macronleaks)
Fox News (pizzagate and
voter fraud)
Dreutz.info (macronleaks) Reddit (pizzagate)
Le Monde (macronleaks) Fdesouche (macronleaks) Twitter (all)
Le Nouvel Observateur
(macronleaks)
WeSearchr (macronleaks)
Le Parisien (macronleaks) Resistance Republicaine
(macronleaks)
Le Point (macronleaks) Re^volution Vibratoire
(pizzagate)
Les Echos (macronleaks) Riposte La€ıque
(macronleaks)
L’Express (macronleaks) The Red State Watcher
(pizzagate)
Liberation (macronleaks) We Got News
(macronleaks)
NBC (all)
Slate (macronleaks)
The Atlantic (all)
The Guardian (all)
The Washington Post
(all)
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in the titular query search frequency. This is established inductively by con-
ducting the three titular search queries, restricted temporally to the specific
dates of the peaks in question. We then generate a hybrid media dataset of arti-
cles, documents, tweets, pictures, memes, and forum posts by gathering sam-
ples of the top Google-indexed content for the date-specific titular queries. By
reconstructing the three storylines around the critical junctures, the first section
of analysis highlights produsers’ use of the reinformative toolkit—particularly
illustrating the pertinent whens (with regard to the other salient elements in the
news cycle), wheres (dissemination on which kinds of fora), and hows (which
techniques, strategies, and framings for injecting content into the news cycle
are applied).
In the second section, we move into the comparative analysis of the con-
spiratory masterplot, focusing on the three renditions of the conspiracy story as
a specific type of narrative vehicle for peddling the deeply suspicious, reinfor-
mative orientation toward the allegedly “elitist” agenda and means of informa-
tion production. In the public eye, it often appears that produsers generate the
imaginatively conspiratory content out of thin air, pegging the question: “How
can they come up with this crazy stuff?” Taking this question quite literally,
we employ thematic coding (Gibbs 2007) of the media datasets generated in
the first section, underlining the passages where the conspiracy story functions
Figure 1 Temporal Development of Relative Frequencies for the Search
Queries “Macronleaks,” “Pizzagate,” and “Voter Fraud” During the Timeframe
(October 2016–May 2017).
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as a reinformative rendition of an archetypical “masterplot” (Abbott 2008:47)
on mainstream media’s complicity with the cabal of elites. By news-framing
prosaic, contemporary events as manifestations of the conspiracy, the produsers
render the masterplot simultaneously new and newsworthy, while harnessing
the archetypical nature of conspiracy story to keep the storyline familiar and
relatable enough for reinforming old and new potential audiences.
Analyzing the Produsage of Reinformation: Conspiracy Stories in the
Hybrid Media System
Tracing the Critical Junctures of News Cycle Intervention
Macronleaks first broke on Friday May 5, 2017, just four hours before the
official end of the campaign and the subsequent 44-hour campaign reporting
embargo mandated by the French law. The conspiracy is revealed in a 9-giga-
byte corpus of documents, consisting of tens of thousands of e-mails and pho-
tos hacked in a cyberattack on La Republique En Marche, the political
movement created by Macron. The leaked corpus was a mixture of fake content
injected into the bulk of authentic documents (Figure 2).
The critical junctures of Macronleaks unraveled at a remarkably rapid
pace. At 18:00 (UTC), the material was distributed on an anonymous site for
sharing documents Pastebin under the title “EMLEAKS.” At 18:35, the Paste-
bin link appeared on the online imageboard 4chan, posted by an unidentified
source. The abrupt beginning of the public exposure for Macronleaks on May
5 is traceable to the tweet by the alt-right produser Jack Posobiec, an American
pro-Trump activist and self-described “citizen journalist” with 100,000 follow-
ers at the time (534,200 in September 2019). This first reference to #Macro-
nLeaks, tweeted at 18:49, was retweeted 15 times within a minute and 87
Figure 2 The Critical Junctures in Macronleaks’ Produsage.
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times during the next 5 minutes, which indicates extensive use of botnets
(@DFRLab 2017).
The next alt-right produser to tweet the story was William Craddick, the
founder and editor-in-chief of Disobedient media and journalist at Zero Hedge,
both American countermedia outlets. Self-proclaimed “discoverer of Pizza-
gate,” Craddick was also the first person to tweet about Macron’s alleged bank
account on the Cayman Islands two days earlier under the hashtag #macron-
gate. Both Posobiec and Craddick instantly retweeted each other, underlining
the intimate collaboration between the two produsers of Macronleaks and its
lesser known precursor Macrongate.
Within an hour, WikiLeaks had tweeted on #MacronLeaks 15 times,
although admitting that it might be a “practical joke” by 4chan. WikiLeaks was
the single most mentioned account in the Macronleaks Twitter storm (Downing
and Ahmed 2019), accounting for almost 20 percent of the all coverage. How-
ever, the combined tweets from Posobiec, Craddick, and Disobedient Media
also amounted to 21.8 percent (@DFRLab 2017) of the coverage.
The Twitter activity was almost equally divided between accounts in the
United States and France during the first hours. The story quickly attracted
attention in France, facilitated by the right-wing populist Front National party.
Just 20 minutes before the French embargo on electoral reporting, Florian
Philippot, the main advisor to the party leader Marine Le Pen, tweeted (transla-
tion by the authors):
Will the #Macronleaks teach us that investigative journalism has been deliberately silenced?
This democratic wreck is appalling.
With the embargo in effect from the midnight May 6 onward, French
newspapers announced that they could not circulate any of the leaked docu-
ments. However, many countermedia sites, including Dreuz.info, spread the
story vigorously. With the help of Posobiec and other American produsers,
these French outlets published content from Got News and We Searchr
(Figure 3).
On May 6, the single day of Macronleaks peak, the campaign offered a
short press release, stating that it had been subject to an extensive data breach
and a carefully planned information operation. This data breach angle, rather
than the leaked evidence of alleged corruption, was also the dominant frame in
international news reporting since May 6 (Ahmed and Downing 2017:3).
Notwithstanding the initially successful intervention in the hybridized news
cycle with timely applied techniques in the reinformative toolkit, Macronleaks
provided Macron’s campaign a unique and unexpected opportunity to gain
mainstream exposure during the embargo. Macron was able to reveal the rein-
formation campaign against him, while also dodging any substantial discussion
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on the allegations entailed in the conspiracy story, which were soon further
overshadowed by his landslide victory. This, together with the relatively small
produser base, likely contributed to the rapid decline in the story’s spread
(Figure 4).
Similar to Macronleaks, Pizzagate originated as the result of hacked and
leaked presidential campaign e-mail exchange. However, the six-month window
for produsing Pizzagate was hundreds of times longer than that of Macronleaks
and marked by two separate phases where the reinformative toolkit was
Figure 3 The Temporal Distribution of the “Macronleaks” Search Query
(October 2016–May 2017).
Figure 4 The Critical Junctures in Pizzagate's Produsage.
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successfully applied by the produsers. Already in March 2016, the personal e-
mail account of John Podesta, chairman of Hillary Clinton’s presidential cam-
paign, was hacked by Fancy Bear, a cyber-espionage group linked by several
state intelligence services to the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU
(Valisluureamet [Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service] 2018:53). Six months
later, during the last month of the U.S. presidential elections, WikiLeaks
founded The Podesta Emails series, leaking the body of some 20,000 pages of
compromised e-mail exchange. From October 7 to November 6—just two days
before the Election Day—WikiLeaks had tweeted 57 times on the Podesta leak,
with half of the tweets receiving over 10,000 shares or likes.
The second phase started at the late stages of WikiLeaks’ Twitter cam-
paign, when the (subsequently deleted) white supremacist account
@DavidGoldbergNY tweeted on a pedophile ring linked to Clinton on October
30. Referring to the Podesta e-mails and “my NYPD sources” investigating
Anthony Weiner (Clinton’s vice campaign manager’s husband), “Goldberg”
further alleged that the police were currently investigating Clinton’s involve-
ment in the scandal. During the next few days, American countermedia outlets
such as Anonews and The Red State Watcher, published several articles, shared
over 100,000 times on Facebook, arguing that the Podesta leak confirms Clin-
ton’s involvement.
On November 3, several 4chan users suggested that the Podesta e-mails
contained passages written in coded language used by pedophiles, encouraging
others to “search for [. . .] possible doublespeak keywords in Wikileaks,” with
references to “cheese pizza” or “CP” presented as placeholders for “child
pornography.” During the same day, links to this content were spread to Twit-
ter for the first time, using the hashtags #JohnMolesta and #pizzagate. This
interpretation started featuring in Google search hits for “pizzagate” a few days
after the elections, right after WikiLeaks’ strategic electoral campaign against
Clinton had ended (Figure 5).
The late peaking of “pizzagate” search queries underlines the significance
of WikiLeaks abandoning its position as the single authoritative outlet for nar-
rating the Podesta hack. This created a vacuum within which grassroots-level
produsers could apply the reinformative toolkit to reappropriate the existing sto-
ryline and start injecting elements of the conspiracy story into the hybrid media
news cycle, apparently independent of any strategic or political guidance. By
mid-November, the intensity of this collective curation had generated a critical
mass of controversy within many prominent produser communities, while still
mostly remaining under the radar of the wider public and the mainstream
media. During this time, the conspiracy theory had evolved to the point where
the Comet Ping Pong pizzeria in Washington, D.C., was established as the
venue of alleged pedophilia ring. The turning point in the mainstream media
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attention took place on November 21 and 22, when several outlets reported on
the hundreds of death threats sent to the pizzeria staff. On November 23, Red-
dit closed the r/pizzagate subreddit as violence inciting.
As the closure was widely reported in the mainstream media, conspiracy
theorizing intensified among the produser communities and on social media.
The produsers, however, gained legitimizing support from Donald Trump’s
transition team, when Michael Flynn Jr. tweeted on December 4:
Until Pizzagate proven to be false, it’ll remain a story. The left seems to forget #PodestaE-
mails and the many ‘coincidences’ tied to it.
The breaking of news on Pizzagate in international headlines took place
the next day, contingent on a gunman assaulting the pizzeria to “investigate
Pizzagate.” After this, there was no new, high-profile coverage of Pizzagate in
the mainstream news cycle. Having briefly attracted the transient spotlight of
mainstream media in the form of global coverage for the conspiracy story, the
produsers were no longer able to apply to reinformative toolkit to inject “alter-
native” framings in the news cycle beyond the countermedia and online image
boards. Pizzagate, however, continued to inspire a transnational community of
conspiracy theorists to produse content within anonymous social media spher-
icules and has been periodically featured in the mainstream media as an cau-
tionary exemplary of the dangers of “fake news” (see Porter 2018; Figure 6).
Unlike Pizzagate and Macronleaks that originated in the respective years
of the most recent presidential elections, public debate surrounding voter fraud
extends back decades in American political history (Levitt 2007). As a term,
Figure 5 The Transition from “Podesta” to “Pizzagate” Search Queries.
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“voter fraud” also pertains to a wide range of phenomena that have very little
resemblance to each other, ranging from individual voter impersonation to more
systemic means of electoral manipulation, such as voter coercion and vote buy-
ing. While these debates typically intensify during the American presidential
elections, Trump used his Twitter account to propel Voter fraud to nigh
unprecedented mainstream coverage.3
Trump only tweeted on the topic of voter fraud ten times before 2016,
never breaking the threshold of one thousand likes or retweets. During 2016,
he tweeted 13 times on Voter fraud, eight of them originating within a month
of the Election Day. On October 17, Trump initiated the Voter fraud conspir-
acy theory with his most liked tweet on the topic at the time, alleging that the
upcoming elections were rigged:
Of course there is large scale voter fraud happening on and before election day. Why do
Republican leaders deny what is going on. So naive!
Many news outlets reported this tweet, with most Google search activity
emerging in conjunction with Fox News’ sensationalist coverage. On the eve of
the Election Day, the TV channel incorrectly claimed that an individual had
voted on behalf of his dead grandmother (who soon turned out to be alive).
Google searches for “voter fraud” started proliferating one month before
the presidential election, peaking twice before rapidly declining to pre-election
levels the day after. This one-month timeframe is business as usual for premed-
itated electoral smear campaigns in general (Vaccari and Morini 2014; Fig-
ure 7).
Up until that point, public attention for the Voter fraud conspiracy theory
had followed the pattern of Google searches of WikiLeaks’ Podesta campaign
(“podesta”) and the “voter fraud” searches emerging in earlier U.S. presidential
Figure 6 The Critical Junctures in Voter Fraud's Produsage.
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elections in the 2000s. From this perspective, Trump’s embrace of the critical
mainstream exposure of his voter fraud narrative is a text-book instance of
media populist logic (Ellinas 2009), whereby “bad press” becomes “good
press,” especially as it was narrated as evidence of “the corrupt mainstream
media” being after “the people’s man.”
However, as a campaign harnessing the reinformative toolkit, Voter fraud
should not be analyzed only from the perspective of electoral strategy.
Although right-wing populist politicians commonly seek any and all coverage
before their breakthrough, they commonly avoid critical media attention after
being elected (Ellinas 2010:206–7). Supported by thousands of online pro-
dusers particularly on Twitter, Trump adopted precisely the opposite approach,
bathing in the flak from mainstream outlets by fanning the flames of the con-
spiracy after his election. Trump’s second voter fraud tweet to exceed the
threshold of 100,000 like came as late as January 25, 2017, calling for a “major
investigation into VOTER FRAUD.” News outlets internationally first called
for and soon reported the results of their fact checking, debunking the claims
of voter fraud in February. However, these articles were only modestly shared
on social media (thousands rather than hundreds of thousands of shares).
There was something quite unprecedented in the continued produsage of
reinformation on voter fraud conspiracy theorizing after the elections. The pro-
longed critical mainstream exposure enhanced in several ways Voter fraud’s
capacity to reappropriate the old voter fraud narrative—particularly among the
countermedia outlets spearheaded by Breitbart News. For instance, for each of
Figure 7 The Temporal Distribution of the “Voter Fraud” Search Query (Octo-
ber 2016–May 2017).
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the 34 articles on Voter fraud published in the four-month period between
October 2016 and February 2017 in The Wall Street Journal, the newspaper
with the largest circulation in the United States, Breitbart News published 132
articles, almost quadrupling the WSJ coverage. This allowed the Trump-cham-
pioning countermedia to claim ownership and authorship of the pre-established,
historical voter fraud narrative. Successful harnessing of the reinformative
toolkit by online produsers and the countermedia facilitated Voter fraud’s entry
into the mainstream news cycle as a spectacle full of drama and controversy,
justifying the media attention on Voter fraud. By narrating Voter fraud as an
extremely important story to be debunked, the “elite media” actually behaved
exactly as suggested by the reinformative narrative. For large American con-
stituencies, the endeavors of debunking Voter fraud in the mainstream media
still linger on as evidence of media elites’ expansive cover-up of the conspiracy
against the American people.
Analyzing the Conspiracy Story as a Reinformative Masterplot
In the previous section, we identified the critical junctures in the produsage
of the conspiracy stories and the practices for intervening the news cycle with
the reinformative toolkit. In this section, we expand the analysis to a specific
narrative device in the hybrid media system, focusing on the conspiracy story
as a reinformative masterplot, and the narrative practices for presenting prosaic,
news-framed content as manifestations of “the conspiracy.”
Notwithstanding the divergent motifs invoked in their narrative subject
matter, Macronleaks, Pizzagate, and Voter fraud each call the audience to inter-
nalize an overarching belief in the unreliability of any authoritative sources of
information. Carrying an emancipatory promise of “lifting the veil of lies”
woven by “the corrupt elite,” the conspiracy story is an enticing format for
advancing reinformation, relying upon countermedia as the “alternative,” anti-
establishment source of information.
There is a twofold challenge in successfully introducing conspiratory con-
tent into the hybridly mediatized political news cycle through the reinformative
toolkit. On the one hand, the conspiracy story must be linked to contemporary
phenomena that can be presented to the audience as news, acutely relevant,
topical, and significant to properly grasp (Tuchmann 1978). On the other hand,
the produsers of this topical news-framed content must also inject adequate ref-
erences or allusions to an archetypical masterplot of an overarching conspiracy
which serves as the interpretative lens that endows the news-framed content
with a desired kind of (reinformative) meaning (Abbott 2008:154–55).
The audience of a successful rendition of the masterplot experiences a
“deja-vu” that transforms a mundane, news-framed content into an embodiment
of “the conspiracy”, thereby realizing the emancipatory promise of the audience
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becoming privy of “a dark secret” that “the elite” is concealing from “the
masses.” Through constant, modular interplay of topical and archetypal narra-
tive components, the circulation of conspiracy stories in hybrid media with new
configurations of tropes expands rather than depletes it (Pappas and Aslanidis
2015).
Macronleaks is a classical conspiracy story whose protagonist is a corrupt
elite cabal working behind the scenes. It follows the tradition of the “cabinet
noir,” a term coined in the seventeenth-century France for Cardinal Richelieu’s
office that opened the letters of King Louis XIV’s opponents. During the 2017
campaign, several candidates suggested that the mainstream media and the judi-
cial system are controlled by the highest echelons of the political elite, who
form a sinister “cabinet noir” intent on impeding the realization of the “popular
will.” According to former presidential candidate Francois Fillon, the judicial
system and the media were manipulated by Francois Hollande to undermine
Fillon. Marine Le Pen likewise alluded to the existence of a “cabinet noir”
inspiring an extensive debate across the countermedia.
The clear strategy behind the Macronleaks was to appear as an authentic
leak, modeled after the 2015 Panama Papers. The documents prodused were
an attempt to give the audience the impression that Macronleaks constitutes a
major news event on a massive leak that unveils a world-scale scandal. The
first attempt to expose Macron’s alleged corruption was through accusations of
illicit money transfers. The initial leak, which materialized a week earlier in the
form of Macrongate, identifies Macron as the owner of an offshore bank
account, purportedly used for tax evasion and money laundering. As Macron-
gate failed to spread (despite Craddick’s and Posobiec’s efforts, and Marine Le
Pen’s in the last televised debate), it was hurriedly modified into Macronleaks
in less than a week.
Macronleaks discussed not only Macron’s “shady” businesses, but empha-
sized his allegedly “corrupt” lifestyle and his “Machiavellian” masterplan. In
order to recount a less technical and more emotive story, a mixture of hastily
prodused “incriminating” e-mails and financial documents were injected into an
authentic corpus of leaked exchange, alleging an interplay of various forms of
corruption of both the body and the soul. Macron was presented working
toward the large-scale Islamization of France: introducing compulsory Arabic
in schools, accepting all applications of asylum, and electing an Imam to lead
the country.
As a further attempt to make the story “juicier,” Macronleaks also pro-
dused content on Macron’s “sexual deviance” with “supporting evidence.”
Countermedia sites Got News and We Searchr—owned by Chuck Johnson, a
former writer for Breitbart News—provided “proof” of the candidate purchas-
ing gay lingerie online. We Searchr wondered why the “favorite candidate of
18 NIKO PYRH€ONEN AND GWENA€ELLE BAUVOIS
the media” was hiding his preference for men, promising a $50,000 reward to
anyone proving Macron’s homosexuality. Macron was also accused of purchas-
ing and consuming cocaine, “evidenced” in e-mails allegedly written by his
advisor, Rapha€el Coulhon. Harnessing the motifs of sex, drugs, and money,
Macronleaks narrates a classical constellation of corruption in order to discredit
the candidate on all possible fronts.
In the case of Pizzagate’s produsage, the delayed commencement points to
a specific news-framing challenge in harnessing the reinformative toolkit: How
to render Clinton’s campaign manager’s e-mail leak—six-month-old, mundane,
and dry textual material—both a topical event, and one that can reinform its
audiences of an overarching conspiracy? The meager traceable evidence of any
storyline evolving during the six-month period after Fancy Bear’s hack of John
Podesta’s e-mails in March 2016 is telling of the initial lack of perceived news-
worthiness and conspiratory significance in Pizzagate’s the source material.
However, beginning in October 2016, one month before the elections,
WikiLeaks started its daily Twitter coverage of the Podesta hack. As opposed to
WikiLeaks’ brief coverage of Macronleaks, Pizzagate’s source material under-
went sustained circulation, evidenced in over 1,000 daily shares and likes in
Twitter. This had the effect of establishing the topicality and electoral impor-
tance of Podesta’s e-mails six months after they were leaked, vesting the leak
with a pinpointable peak in public attention. Although the e-mails proved to be
largely void of any incriminatingly conspiratory discoveries on the Clinton
campaign, the attention roused produsers in swaths. A chaotic form of collec-
tive symbolic exegesis became the definitive tool through which produsers
started compiling a synopsis for Pizzagate that could, notwithstanding its inter-
nal conflicts, reinform audiences in accordance to the conspiratory masterplot.
Based on conspiratory readings of Podesta’s e-mails, Pizzagate first
emerged as repeated shitpostings of a joke in which thousands of produsers
participated across designated online fora, such as 4chan, Pastebin, and Reddit.
“[C]haracterized by its disruption of previously established standards of dis-
course” (McEwan 2017:19), shitposting added two intertwined, strongly affec-
tive layers—tragedy and comedy—as the yeast into the conspiratorial dough.
As many produsers chose, often jocularly, to treat e-mails as coded language,
they invited each other to collaborate in divining the wicked and hidden prac-
tices of the conspiratory elite from the prosaic passages detailing Podesta’s din-
ing habits.
The process of collective curation, chaotic as it was, followed certain pre-
scribed guidelines. Similar to the ancient Roman practice of haruspicy—where
omens were read in entrails of sacrificial animals—produsers used pizza-related
excerpts as the divinatory leitmotif around which the conspiracy story was
named and hashtagged. Indeed, “cheese pizza” and “CP” were used as pertinent
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expressions for child pornography on online image boards already in the early
2000s, becoming introduced in the Urban Dictionary in 2010. This provided
the produsers both an inspiration and a reference for reinforming their audi-
ences.
Unlike Macronleaks and Voter fraud, Pizzagate succeeded in also inject-
ing a concrete call to action into the synopsis for those inclined to relate to the
conspiracy story as a thriller and tragedy, rather than a comedy. Pizzagate rei-
fied the conspiracy from the mythical realm back to the mundane world by
naming the (non-existent) basement of Comet Ping Pong pizzeria as the loca-
tion where the conspiracy of the pedophile political cabal convenes. By
November, this rendition of the masterplot had contributed to the channeling of
death threats to the pizzeria’s patron James Alefantis (mispronounced, with
effort, as “J’aime les enfants,” French for “I love children”). As the thoroughly
reinformed gunman attacked the pizzeria in December, the conspiratory myth
finally became a mainstream news event of a contemporary fable to be dis-
sected, deconstructed, dispelled, and debunked.
The synopsis of Voter fraud differs from the other two conspiracy stories
in the extent to which it is modeled after a familiar set recurring of voter fraud
allegations, evidenced in the cyclical pattern of peaking “voter fraud” search
queries during the U.S. presidential elections. Even so, the conspiratory master-
plot sets the 2016 synopsis apart from these earlier renditions of voter fraud,
instead aligning the storyline with Macronleaks and Pizzagate.
While the asserted scale of illegal voting, ranging from thousands to mil-
lions of people voting illegally, coincides with the allegations launched during
earlier elections, the scale of the underlying conspiracy is presented as radically
more deeply rooted in 2016. In addition to pointing the blame to corrupted
Democrats who benefit from “illegal” votes, Trump questions the reasons for
the “na€ıvete” and “denialism” among the “Republican leaders.” This way,
Trump harnesses the conspiratory masterplot according to which the tendrils of
corruption run much deeper within the political elite than previously thought,
allegedly involving wide swaths of the establishment across the partisan divide.
The 2016 rendition of voter fraud as an elevated bipartisan crisis, spear-
headed by Trump’s public performance of the rekindled crisis, had important
implications that also contributed to Voter fraud’s consistent and persistent cov-
erage by mainstream media. Previous voter fraud champions—such as John
McCain, who operationalized a limited and strictly partisan variant of the narra-
tive in 2008—struggled to articulate why they had not been able to bring about
a party-wide, let alone bipartisan, coalition to fight voter fraud (Berlet 2010).
By operationalizing the conspiratory masterplot, Trump adopted a messianic
position as an “external political figure” who could “dry the swamp” of ubiqui-
tous systemic corruption. Emphasizing the encompassing scale of the
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conspiracy, Trump and the permanent echo of online produsers could reach
and electrify also those audiences who remained relatively indifferent to the
previous, smaller scale allegations of voter fraud.
By continuing to tweet about Voter fraud for months after the elections,
and receiving an increased number of likes, retweets and further media atten-
tion, Trump was able to circumvent one of the most obvious critiques of Voter
fraud as the conspiracy theory as a means to either securing votes or justifying
losing. Indeed, if one were to interpret Voter fraud strictly as an electoral strat-
egy like its earlier manifestations, it would be hard to explain why Trump had
not only continued to keep the easily debunked narrative alive, but also had
been more successful in spreading it after his election.
Conclusion: Divergent Avenues for Produsing Hybrid Media
Reinformation
The second decade of the 2000s has seen the proliferation of arguments,
both within and outside academia, on whether we are living a “post-truth era.”
Some have challenged the whole notion, commonly pointing out that there has
never been an era in which politicians did not lie (Korvela et al. 2017; Mariscal
2017:6; Stein 2017). By analyzing the wax and wane of three conspiracy sto-
ries that featured abundantly in the hybrid media system, we suggest a range of
more nuanced approaches for studying “post-truthfulness” as the process of
reinformation that shifts the focus beyond the mere juxtaposition of facts and
lies.
Although conspiracy stories do spawn and spread imaginative disinforma-
tion in highly divergent narrative shapes and forms, their produsers do not pri-
marily peddle information. By employing a set of techniques in the
reinformative toolkit for intervening the news cycle, they spread a paranoid,
“quasi-religious” orientation (Franks, Bangerter, and Bauer 2013) toward the
social world, articulated in the masterplot of a ubiquitous conspiracy among the
“the elite”—a catch-all term for politicians, mainstream media, and democratic
institutions at large.
As reinformation operates within the realm of collective identification
among the “underdogs” of “the media war” (Copsey 1996:123), attempts to
counter this profoundly suspicious orientation toward social world by “fact
checking” and “debunking” fake news can only yield modest results. Macron-
leaks, Pizzagate, and Voter fraud are all renditions of the masterplot that invites
the audience to collectively identify as “disenfranchised” citizens, the under-
dogs, who must rely on “alternative” sources of information in order to become
the counterforce to the corrupt elite and its gatekeeping henchmen in the main-
stream media.
PRODUSING REINFORMATION IN HYBRID MEDIA 21
Although the synopses of the three conspiracy stories embody the same
masterplot, our analysis points to a great variance in how the produsers of the
stories relate to and participate in storytelling. On the one end of the spectrum,
Pizzagate’s produsage is marked by a distinct aura of “carnivalesque” (Bakhtin
1968), whereby produsers organically form an “in-joke” collectivity around
“shitposting,” “memes,” and “lulz” (Murray and Lemieux 2019:82). While “the
satanic pedophile cabal of political elite, convening in the basement of a D.C.
pizzeria” is a fitting motif for reifying the anti-elite masterplot, it is clearly not
an ideal vehicle for credibly advancing any real-world political agenda. This
suggests that for many of the produsers, instead of a shared political goal or
belief, the act of participating in the collective curation of the phantasmal visual
and textual iconography is an end in itself. The resulting shape and magnitude
in which Pizzagate spread across hybrid and mainstream media could not be
envisioned, let alone controlled, by neither WikiLeaks nor the Russian Podesta
hackers when they made the source content available.
On the other end of the spectrum, Macronleaks’ produsage features many
characteristics that could be conceptualized as “strategic.” Orchestrated top-
down by two identifiable alt-right figures, Posobiec and Craddick, there is little
traceable evidence of grassroots-level involvement in its produsage. Unlike Piz-
zagate’s six-month incubation period from the initial leak, Macronleaks was
first channeled to its audiences only two days before the elections. As a reinfor-
mative “precision strike,” the lack of time and human resources turned Macron-
leaks into a slightly customized version of 2015 Panama Papers controversy,
with only a few doctored e-mails injected into the leak to suggest Macron’s
homosexuality and rampant cocaine use.
Compared to the other two conspiracy theories, Voter fraud successfully
combined both organic content development by a myriad of online produsers
while still maintaining distinct strategic control over the storyline. Harnessing a
pre-existing narrative template can greatly facilitate early stages of produsage,
as only minute cues suffice for conjuring up a sense of familiarity with another
news-framed scandal, such as Panama Papers for Macronleaks or earlier voter
fraud allegations for Voter fraud. However, such legacy can also make it harder
to articulate a conspiracy theory’s topicality “here and now.” This, together
with a less developed online sphere for political debate, likely contributed to
the limited spread and impact of previous voter fraud allegations.
Voter fraud sought to circumvent the challenge of newsworthiness by
framing the conspiracy in a manner that transcended the tired partisan smear
campaign by linking it to the masterplot of an overarching conspiracy. Generat-
ing Voter fraud and steering its produsage with his tweets, Trump presented
“the elite” at large—including establishment Republicans—at least tacitly com-
plicit through their long-standing denial or ignorance of Voter fraud. Unlike
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with Macronleaks, Trump’s strategic control did not impede capitalizing on
more organically evolving content. Asserted occurrences of illegal voting—ini-
tially reported as news events by sympathetic countermedia outlets—were soon
covered by mainstream outlets who generated spread for the conspiracy theory
they sought to debunk.
Each of the conspiracy stories studied was successful in crossing the
threshold of mainstream gatekeeping, notwithstanding the varying persistence
of their coverage. Instrumental in this success is the free labor voluntarily put
in by the produsers as digital foot soldiers, generating spread across hybrid
media spaces. The analysis of produsers’ involvement in the collective curation
of the conspiracy stories illustrates how the reinformative toolkit is harnessed
in public storytelling.
By developing means for intervening the hybridly mediatized news cycle
via social media and countermedia outlets with various “leaks” and “scandals,”
the produsers both draw from and replenish the range of techniques in the
toolkit. With regard to the narrative subject matter, presidential elections as a
deeply polarizing media event offer fertile ground for merging the archetypical
masterplot of “the elites” conspiracy with topical and mundane, news-framed
components covered daily in the mainstream media. The sustained engagement
by the collectivity of online produsers collectivity, such as the one echoing the
Trump-led rendition of Voter fraud long after his election, exemplifies how
conspiracy stories can outlive and transcend any strategic, political aspirations
that gave them birth. This involvement informs and expands future pursuits of
reinformation, both in terms of repertoires of social action and narrative
devices.
ENDNOTES
*Please direct correspondence to Niko Pyrh€onen, The Centre for Research on Ethnic
Relations and Nationalism (CEREN), Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki,
P.O. Box 16 (Snellmaninkatu 12), FI-00014 Helsinki, Finland; Tel: +358503461896; e-mail:
niko.pyrhonen@helsinki.fi
1Although the French variant “reinformation” has been used as a distinct term in scientific
publications on medicine, biology, and exegetics from 1920s onwards, the aforementioned use in
social scientific research can be traced back to the post-war era (on Allied endeavors to penetrate
the censorship practices of former axis countries, see Joseph 1947).
2It is important to note, however, that while “macronleaks” and “pizzagate” queries provide
results in Google that are unique to the conspiracy story in question, the query “voter fraud” also
links to the concept of voter fraud and earlier controversies that we do not include in these analy-
ses.
3Before 2016, the Google search frequency for the query “voter fraud” was only matched dur-
ing the late stages of Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign.
PRODUSING REINFORMATION IN HYBRID MEDIA 23
REFERENCES
Abbott, H. Porter. 2008. The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative. Cambridge Introductions to
Literature. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ahmed, Wasim and Joseph Downing. 2017. “Campaign Leaks and the Far-Right: Who Influenced
#Macronleaks on Twitter?” EUROPP – European Politics and Policy.
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhaılovich. 1968. Rabelais and His World Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
Barrera Rodriguez, Oscar, Sergei M. Guriev, Emeric Henry, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2018.
“Facts, Alternative Facts, and Fact Checking in Times of Post-Truth Politics.” SSRN
Scholarly Paper ID 3004631. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Berlet, Chip. 2010. “The Roots of Anti-Obama Rhetoric.” Research in Race and Ethnic Relations
16(December):301–19.
Blanc, Charlotte. 2016. “Reseaux Traditionalistes Catholiques et «Reinformation » sur le web :
Mobilisations Contre le «Mariage Pour Tous » et « pro-vie ».” tic&societe 9(1–2).
Bruns, Axel. 2008. Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage.
New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing Inc.
Bruns, Axel. 2017. “Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence.” News &
Politics, September.
Bruns, Axel and Jean Burgess. 2012. “Researching News Discussion on Twitter.” Journalism
Studies 13(5–6):801–14.
Cammaerts, Bart. 2007. “Media and Communication Stragies of Glocalized Activists: Beyond
Media-Centric Thinking.” Pp. 265–83 in Reclaiming the Media: Communication Rights and
Democratic Media Roles, edited by Bart Cammaerts and Nico Carpentier. Bristol, UK:
Intellect.
Chadwick, Andrew. 2011. “The Political Information Cycle in a Hybrid News System: The British
Prime Minister and the ‘Bullygate’ Affair.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 16
(1):3–29.
Chadwick, Andrew. 2013. The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Chadwick, Andrew, James Dennis, and Amy P. Smith. 2015. “Politics in the Age of Hybrid Media.
Power, Systems and Media Logics.” Pp. 7–22 in The Routledge Companion to Social Media
and Politics, edited by Axel Bruns, Gunn Enli, Eli Skogerbo, Anders Olof Larsson, and
Christian Christensen. New York, NY: Routledge.
Copsey, Nigel. 1996. “Contemporary Fascism in the Local Arena: The British National Party and
‘Rights for Whites’.” Pp. 118–40 in The Failure of British Fascism: The Far-Right and the Fight
for Political Recognition, edited by Mike Cronin. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cottrell, David, Michael C. Herron, and Sean J. Westwood. 2018. “An Exploration of Donald
Trump's Allegations of Massive Voter Fraud in the 2016 General Election.” Electoral Studies
51(February):123–42.
@DFRLab. 2017. “Hashtag Campaign: #MacronLeaks.” Digital Forensic Research Lab (blog).
May 5, 2017.
Downing, Joseph and Wasim Ahmed. 2019. “#MacronLeaks as a ‘Warning Shot’ for European
Democracies: Challenges to Election Blackouts Presented by Social Media and Election
Meddling During the 2017 French Presidential Election.” French Politics 17(3):257–78.
Dugas, Andrea Freyer, Yu-Hsiang Hsieh, Scott R. Levin, Jesse M. Pines, Darren P. Mareiniss,
Amir Mohareb, Charlotte A. Gaydos, Trish M. Perl, and Richard E. Rothman. 2012. “Google
Flu Trends: Correlation With Emergency Department Influenza Rates and Crowding Metrics.”
Clinical Infectious Diseases 54(4):463–69.
24 NIKO PYRH€ONEN AND GWENA€ELLE BAUVOIS
Ellinas, Antonis. 2009. “Chaotic but Popular? Extreme-Right Organisation and Performance in the
Age of Media Communication.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17(2):209–21.
Ellinas, Antonis. 2010. The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist
Card Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Eranti, Veikko. 2016. “Individuals Doing Politics : Urban Participation, Social Media Campaigning
and Online Nano-Politics.”
Faris, Robert, Hal Roberts, Bruce Etling, Nikki Bourassa, Ethan Zuckerman, and Yochai Benkler.
2017. “Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3019414. Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network.
Feldman, Martha S. and Julka Almqvist. 2011. “Analyzing the Implicit in Stories.” Pp. 207–28 in
Varieties of Narrative Analysis, edited by James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium. Los
Angeles, CA: Sage.
Fenster, Mark. 2017. “American Conspiracy Theories.” Perspectives on Politics 15(1):257–58.
Ferrara, Emilio. 2017. “Disinformation and Social Bot Operations in the Run Up to the 2017
French Presidential Election.” ArXiv:1707.00086 [Physics], June.
Franks, Bradley, Adrian Bangerter, and Martin Bauer. 2013. “Conspiracy Theories as Quasi-Religious
Mentality: An Integrated Account From Cognitive Science, Social Representations Theory, and
Frame Theory.” Frontiers in Psychology 4:424. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00424
Galston, William Arthur 2003. “If Political Fragmentation Is the Problem, Is the Internet the
Solution.” The Civic Web: Online Politics and Democratic Values, 35–44.
Gerstle, Jacques. 2012. “Mediatisation de La Vie Politique et Campagnes Presidentielles.” Cahiers
Francais 370(September):41–6.
Gibbs, Graham. 2007. “Thematic Coding and Categorizing.” Pp. 38–55 in Analyzing Qualitative
Data. London, UK: Sage.
Gitlin, Tamar. 1998. “Public Spheres or Public Sphericules?” Pp. 168–74 in Media, Ritual and
Identity, edited by Tamar Liebes and James Curran. London, UK: Routledge.
Hare, Isabelle. 2004. “Le re^ve brise de Charles Enderlin: transposition du conflit israelo-palestinien
devant les locaux de France 2.” XVIIe Congres International des Sociologues de Langue
Francaise: 166–74. Tours, France: Universite de Tours.
Hatakka, Niko. 2016. “When Logics of Party Politics and Online Activism Collide: The Populist
Finns Party's Identity under Negotiation.” New Media & Society, August.
IFOP Institut francais d'opinion publique. 2017. “Enque^te sur le Complotisme.” Paris, France: La
Foundation Jean-Jaures et Conspiracy Watch.
Jammet, Thomas and Diletta Guidi. 2017. “Observer Les Observateurs. Du Pluralisme Mediatique
au Populisme Anti-Islam, Analyse D'un Site de « Reinformation » Suisse et de ses
Connexions.” Reseaux 202–203(2–3):241–71.
Joseph, Robert. 1947. “How Far Was It a Success?” Hollywood Quarterly 2(2):122–30.
Jun, Seung-Pyo, Hyoung Sun Yoo, and San Choi. 2018. “Ten Years of Research Change Using
Google Trends: From the Perspective of Big Data Utilizations and Applications.”
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 130(May):69–87.
Keyes, Ralph. 2004. The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life. New
York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
Korvela, Paul-Erik, Johanna Vuorelma, Ari-Elmer Hyv€onen, Mira S€oderman, and Jouni Tilli, eds.
2017. Puhun Niin Totta Kuin Osaan: Politiikka Faktojen J€alkeen. Jyv€askyl€a, Finland: Docendo.
Lazer, David M. J., Matthew A. Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J. Berinsky, Kelly M. Greenhill,
Filippo Menczer, Miriam J. Metzger, Brendan Nyhan, Gordon Pennycook, David Rothschild,
Michael Schudson, Steven A. Sloman, Cass R. Sunstein, Emily A. Thorson, Duncan J. Watts,
and Jonathan L. Zittrain. 2018. “The Science of Fake News.” Science 359(6380):1094–96.
PRODUSING REINFORMATION IN HYBRID MEDIA 25
Leskovec, Jure, Lars Backstrom, and Jon Kleinberg. 2009. “Meme-Tracking and the Dynamics of
the News Cycle.” In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. Paris, France: ACM.
Levitt, Justin. 2007. “The Truth About Voter Fraud.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1647224.
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Lewandowsky, Stephan, Ullrich K. H. Ecker, and John Cook. 2017. “Beyond Misinformation:
Understanding and Coping With the ‘Post-Truth’ Era.” Journal of Applied Research in
Memory and Cognition 6(4):353–69.
Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1(1):51–69.
Luhtakallio, Eeva 2012. Practicing Democracy: Local Activism and Politics in France and Finland.
London, UK: Palgrave.
Maigrot, Cedric, Ewa Kijak, and Vincent Claveau. 2016. “Medias Traditionnels, Medias Sociaux :
Caracteriser La Reinformation.” TALN 2016:1–9.
Mariscal, Vincent. 2017. “La Post-Verite: Un Dispositif de Stigmatisation et de Depolitisation des
Classes Populaires?” ARC – Action et Recherches Culturelles 1–14.
Mazzoleni, Gianpietro. 2003. “The Media and the Growth of Neo-Populism in Contemporary
Democracies.” Pp. 1–20 in The Media and Neo-Populism: A Contemporary Comparative
Analysis, edited by Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart, and Bruce Horsfield. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
McEwan, Sean. 2017. “Nation of Shitposters: Ironic Engagement With the Facebook Posts of
Shannon Noll as Reconfiguration of an Australian National Identity.” Platform: Journal of
Media and Communication 8(January):19–39.
McGranahan, Carole. 2017. “An Anthropology of Lying: Trump and the Political Sociality of
Moral Outrage.” American Ethnologist 44(2):243–48.
Mercier, Arnaud. 2006. “Logiques Journalistiques et Lecture Evenementielle des Faits D'actualite.”
Hermes 46(3):23–35.
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
M€uller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadephia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Murray, Stuart J. and Tad Lemieux. 2019. “Combat-Debat: Parataxis and the Unavowable
Community; or, The Joke.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 52(1):78–85.
Nagle, Angela. 2017. Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4Chan And Tumblr To Trump
And The Alt-Right. Winchester, UK: Zero Books.
Nahon, Karine. 2015. “Where There Is Social Media There Is Politics.” Pp. 39–55 in The
Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics, edited by Axel Bruns, Gunn Enli, Eli
Skogerbo, Anders Olof Larsson, and Christian Christensen. New York, NY: Routledge.
Nixon, Brice. 2015. “The Exploitation of Audience Labour: A Missing Perspective on
Communication and Capital in the Digital Era.” Pp. 99–114 in Reconsidering Value and
Labour in the Digital Age, edited by Christian Fuchs, Eran Fisher. London, UK: Palgrave.
Papacharissi, Zizi. 2002. “The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere.” New Media &
Society 4(1):9.
Pappas, Takis S. and Paris Aslanidis. 2015. “Greek Populism: A Political Drama in Five Acts.” Pp.
181–96 in European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, edited by Hanspeter
Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
Pariser, Eli. 2012. The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read
and How We Think. London, UK: Penguin Books.
Porter, Jon. 2018. “Safari's Suggested Search Results Have Been Promoting Conspiracies, Lies, and
Misinformation.” The Verge.
26 NIKO PYRH€ONEN AND GWENA€ELLE BAUVOIS
Pyrh€onen, Niko. 2015. “The True Colors of Finnish Welfare Nationalism. Consolidation of Neo-
Populist Advocacy as a Resonant Collective Identity Through Mobilization of Exclusionary
Narratives of Blue-and-White Solidarity.”
Rebillard, Franck. 2017. “La Rumeur du PizzaGate Durant la Presidentielle de 2016 aux Etats-
Unis.” Reseaux, 202–203(June):273–310.
Reilly, Shauna, Sean Richey, and John Benjamin Taylor. 2012. “Using Google Search Data for
State Politics Research: An Empirical Validity Test Using Roll-Off Data.” State Politics &
Policy Quarterly 12(2):146–59.
Shifman, Limor. 2014. “The Cultural Logic of Photo-Based Meme Genres.” Journal of Visual
Culture 13(3):340–58.
Stein, Felix. 2017. “‘Post-Truth’ and the Social Sciences”, Association for Political and Legal
Anthropology.
Sunstein, Cass R. 2008. “Neither Hayek nor Habermas.” Public Choice 134(1/2):87–95.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review
51(2):273–86.
Tuchmann, Gaye. 1978. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York, NY:
Free Press.
Vaccari, Cristian and Marco Morini. 2014. “The Power of Smears in Two American Presidential
Campaigns.” Journal of Political Marketing 13(1–2):19–45.
Vaccari, Cristian and Augusto Valeriani. 2016. “Party Campaigners or Citizen Campaigners? How
Social Media Deepen and Broaden Party-Related Engagement.” The International Journal of
Press/Politics 21(3):294–312.
Valisluureamet [Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service]. 2018. “International Security and Estonia
2018.”
Vosoughi, Soroush, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. 2018. “The Spread of True and False News Online.”
Science 359(6380):1146–51.
Wieviorka, Michel. 2017. “Face a La « Postverite » et Au « Complotisme ».” La Nouvelle Revue
des Sciences Sociales 8:81–96.
Yl€a-Anttila, Tuukka. 2017. “The Populist Toolkit : Finnish Populism in Action 2007–2016.”
Yl€a-Anttila, Tuukka, Gwena€elle Bauvois, and Niko Pyrh€onen. 2019. “Politicization of Migration in
the Countermedia Style: A Computational and Qualitative Analysis of Populist Discourse.”
Discourse, Context & Media 32.
PRODUSING REINFORMATION IN HYBRID MEDIA 27
